Book: Athens and Jerusalem

Truth and recognition.
When a person tries to convince others of his truth, that is, to make what has been revealed to him binding on everyone, he usually thinks that he is guided by high motives: love for others, the desire to enlighten the dark and lost, etc. And the theory of knowledge and ethics support him in this: they establish that truth is one and truth is truth for all. But the theory of knowledge with ethics and the humane sages equally poorly distinguish where the need to bring everyone to a single truth comes from. It is not the neighbors who want to benefit the one who bothers to bring all to the same truth. He cares little about his neighbors. But he himself does not dare and cannot accept his truth until he achieves real or imagined recognition of "all." For it is important for him not so much to have the truth as to receive general recognition. That is why ethics and the theory of knowledge are so concerned with restricting the rights of questioners as much as possible. Even Aristotle called any "exaggerated" inquisitiveness ill-manneredness. Such a consideration, or rather, such a recusal, would not seem convincing to anyone if for people the recognition of their truth would not be more important than the truth itself.