Author of quotes: David Hume

Our perceptions are our only objects.

Since we are not in a position to explain satisfactorily on the basis of which we believe, after a thousand experiments, that every stone will fall and fire will burn, how can we be satisfied with any view of the origin of the worlds, or of the state in which nature has been from time to time, and of the one in which it will dwell forever and ever?

The mind sees a bright light illuminating some points, but this light borders on the deepest darkness; meanwhile, the mind itself, being in the middle, is so blinded and confused that it can no longer judge anything with certainty and certainty.

Nevertheless, the mind must treat with anxiety and concern even the very skepticism to which it is led by all these seeming absurdities and about tivorechia.

The great destroyers of Pyrrhoism, or excessive skepticism, are the activities, occupations, and affairs of everyday life. These principles can flourish and dominate [philosophical] schools, where it is really difficult, if not impossible, to refute them. But as soon as they come out of the shadows, and through the presence of real objects that excite our affects and feelings, they come face to face with the strongest principles of our nature, they will disappear like smoke, leaving the most convinced skeptic in the same position as other mortals.

The main and most compelling objection to excessive skepticism is that it cannot be of long-term benefit as long as it retains all its strength and power. One has only to ask such a skeptic what he actually wants and what he achieves through all this curious research, and he will immediately get lost and will not know what to answer. Followers of Copernicus or Ptolemy, advocating two different systems of astronomy, may hope to lead their listeners to some kind of permanent and enduring conviction. The Stoic or Epicurean lays out principles that not only can be sustainable, but also influence the behavior and way of life of people. The adherent of Pyrrhonism cannot hope that his philosophy will have a permanent influence on the mind, or, if this influence is carried out, the latter will be beneficial to society. On the contrary, he must admit, if he is willing to admit anything at all, that the whole structure of human life would have to undergo destruction if its principles were to gain universal and lasting domination. All conversations, all activities would immediately cease, and people would be in complete lethargy until their miserable existence came to an end due to the dissatisfaction of natural needs. True, such a fatal end can hardly be feared, for nature is always much stronger than principles.

In a word, I very much doubt the possibility that the cause was known only by its action (as you assumed all the time) or was so singular and extraordinary in nature that it would not have a parallel or similarity with any other cause or other object. which has ever been subject to our observation.

There is another condition, I replied, that you seem to have overlooked. Even if I agreed with your premises, I would have to deny your conclusions. You conclude that religious doctrines and reasoning cannot have an impact on life because they should not, you conclude, not paying attention to the fact that people do not reason like you, but draw many conclusions from the belief in the existence of the Deity and assume that God will impose other punishments on vice and give other rewards of virtue than those, which appear in the normal course of nature. It is not whether this conclusion is true or not: its influence on their lives and behavior remains the same in both cases, and those who seek to deprive people of faith in such prejudices may perhaps be sound thinkers, but I do not agree to recognize them as good citizens and politicians, because they free people from the bridle that restrains their passion. and thus make the violation of social laws in some respects an easier and safer affair.

The main source of our error in this matter and the boundless freedom of speculation that we enjoy is the fact that we quietly put ourselves in the place of the Supreme Being and conclude that it will always adhere to the same course of action that we would recognize in its place. the most reasonable and appropriate. However, already on the basis of observing the usual course of nature, we could be convinced that almost everything in it is subject to principles and rules that are completely different from ours; and besides this, we will obviously act contrary to all the rules of analogy, if, based on the intentions and plans of people, we will reason about the intentions of a being so different from them and so much superior to them.

At the birth of new religions, wise and learned people usually consider the question [of the miracles associated with them] too insignificant to merit their attention or consideration; and later, when they would willingly open a deception in order to dissuade the erring crowd, it turns out that the time has already passed, documents and witnesses who could clarify the case have died irrevocably; they have no means of exposure other than those that must be extracted from the testimony of the witnesses themselves; but, although these means always satisfy intelligent and educated people, they are usually too subtle for understanding the crowd.

There are no conclusions more pleasing to skepticism than those that reveal anything concerning the weakness and narrow boundaries of the mind and ability of man.

Perhaps we are able to know complex ideas well by means of a definition that is nothing more than a list of parts, or simple ideas from which complex ones are composed. But when we bring our definitions to the simplest ideas and still find some ambiguity and darkness in them, what means will remain at our disposal?

The enormous advantage of the mathematical sciences over the moral ones is that the ideas of the former, being accessible to sensation, are always clear and definite; the slightest difference between these ideas can immediately be noticed, and the same terms always express the same ideas without any ambiguity or change. An oval is never mistaken for a circle, but a hyperbola for an ellipse. The isosceles and versatile triangles are separated from each other by more precise boundaries than vice from virtue and good from evil.

Because of this, ambiguity gradually creeps into our reasoning: we easily mistake similar objects for identical ones, and the conclusion in the end deviates greatly from the premises.